Abstract-Containment of worms constitutes an important challenge in mobile wireless networks as recent outbreaks have revealed actual vulnerabilities. We introduce a defense strategy that quarantines the malware by reducing the communication range. This countermeasure confronts us with a tradeoff: reducing the communication range suppresses the spread of the malware; however, it also deteriorates the network performance. We model the propagation of the malware as a deterministic epidemic. Using an optimal control framework, we select the optimal communication range that captures the above tradeoff by minimizing a global cost function. Using Pontryagin's Maximum Principle, we derive structural characteristics of the optimal communication range as a function of time for general cost functions. Our numerical computations reveal that the dynamic optimal control of the communication range significantly outperforms static choices and is also robust to errors in estimation of the network and attack parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION

M
ALICIOUS computer software, in the form of worms, have inflicted enormous damages on computer networks. For instance, during an outbreak of Code Red on July 19, 2001 , hundreds of thousands of computers were infected in a blazing speed, inflicting repair costs of billions of dollars [2] . Worms, as self-replicating codes, have the potential of exploiting their infected hosts to infect other nodes and exponentially multiply the number of their victims: a phenomenon that we call epidemic. Thus, detection and containment of malware have drawn substantial attention among the Internet research community ( [2] - [5] , etc). However, a new battlefield has emerged: personal mobile devices such as cell-phones, smart-phones and pocket-PCs are acquiring more computation and communication capabilities, and hence, new vulnerabilities are introduced. The sprouting popularity of these mobile devices combined with their new capabilities have created an ideal prey-ground for future malware [3] , [6] . In wireless networks, since resources are scarce, worms can cause new forms of havoc above and beyond those in wired networks. For instance, as the media in wireless networks is common, bandwidth is severely limited. The increased rate of attempts to access the media by infected nodes can jam the media and thereby disrupt network functionalities [7] . The dimensions of the threat become more alarming when we consider the huge investments that have been directed towards wireless communication infrastructure and the economic liability that is built upon it. The viability of these investments is contingent upon designing effective detection and containment strategies.
In this paper, we focus on the containment of infection in a mobile wireless network. As we pointed out, several wireless properties enhance the severity of the infection. However, these unique features can also be utilized to contrive new countermeasures against the spread of infection. An infected node can transmit its infection to another node only if they are in communication range of each other. We propose to quarantine the infection by regulating the communication range of the nodes. Specifically, the reception gain of the healthy nodes can be reduced to abate the frequency of contacts between the mobile nodes and thus suppress the spread of the infection. In fact, there is an interesting analogy between the spread of a worm in mobile wireless networks and a biological epidemic in a human community. During a biological virus outbreak, individuals might choose to restrain their contacts with the rest of the society. This abstinence decreases the chance of getting infected at the expense of deterioration in the quality of life: a decrease in the rate of communication between the members of the society hampers their ability to fully perform their daily tasks [8] . Such a tradeoff also exists in the case of a mobile wireless network: reducing the communication range of nodes can deteriorate the QoS offered by the network, as the end-to-end communication delay increases.
We present a containment strategy based on power control. We propose an optimal control framework to characterize the tradeoff between the containment efficacy and communication capabilities of the nodes (Section III). Using Pontryagin's Maximum Principle, we devise a framework for computing the dynamically evolving optimal communication range. We identify several structural characteristics of the optimal control by examining the analytical properties of the solution (Section V). Specifically, for a general concave cost function (Section V-B), we show that the optimal solution has the classical bang-bang structure, i.e., it is only at its minimum or maximum values. We prove that the optimal solution in this case has at most two (abrupt) transitions between these extreme values. Subsequently, we establish that the optimal solution follows a similar structure for a strictly convex cost function, with the exception that transitions are continuous and smooth instead of being abrupt (Section V-C). Finally, we demonstrate that dynamic optimal control of the communication range significantly outperforms static choices, and is also robust to errors in estimation of the network and attack parameters (Section VIII).
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Most of the literature on worm propagation traditionally assume a wired network framework and also chiefly, the underlying network is the internet. An engaging historical review of major recent malware outbreaks in networks may for instance be found in [9] . Deterministic epidemiological frameworks have been used to model the propagation of malware in the internet [2] , [3] , [10] - [14] . [15] combined a deterministic worm propagation model with a game theoretic process that involves learning, in order to incorporate decisions of users about whether to install or uninstall a security patch in a wired network. Game theoretic techniques for the analysis of network security have been used in [16] , [17] , among others.
Controlling the spread of the worm by reducing the rate of communication of nodes [18] , [19] , or the number of communications [4] , are the closest analogs in wired networks to reducing the communication range of the nodes in wireless networks. The work in [18] is based on heuristics and simulations. Next, unlike our work, [19] does not propose a formal framework for attaining desired tradeoffs, and considers only a static choice of the communication rate, whereas we allow the communication range of the nodes to dynamically evolve over time as the infection level fluctuates. Recently, [4] has proposed to contain a worm in the initial phase of infection by limiting the total number of distinct contacts per node over the containment cycle, and models the growth of the worm using a stochastic branching process. However, this work only applies to the initial phase of infection and their countermeasure is ineffective once the epidemic starts.
Control theoretic tools have been used in [20] to propose a feedback-based (but heuristic) strategy for containment of malware in a wired network. [21] - [24] adopt malware propagation models to investigate an optimal dynamic response based on a quantified cost function in communication networks. [21] , [22] assume the viewpoint of an attacker and propose a maximum damage malware attack in an energy-constrained network. This work differs from [23] , [24] in that 1) we propose and investigate reduction of reception gain of nodes in a wireless network as a countermeasure rather than dynamically changing the settings of firewall softwares [23] , or rate of recovery [24] , and 2) we consider cost functions which are only assumed to be either concave or convex and are therefore more general than quadratic functions. Also unlike [23] we do not use any linearization of the system which can be inadequate in the context of epidemic behavior. Optimal control has also been used as an effective tool to develop immunization and/or screening strategies to counter the spread of a biological or social epidemic [25] - [28] . Introduction of our new countermeasure policy in the framework of mobile wireless network results in a new optimal control problem that requires an original analysis and previous results in [23] - [28] do not apply here.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
To begin, let us introduce some terminologies. A node is called susceptible if it is not contaminated by the worm, but is prone to infection. A node is infective if it has the worm. Infective nodes can propagate the worm through communication with susceptible nodes. Upon detection of an infective node, either the user of an infected device or the network operator removes the infection of the node by installing a security patch, which also grants the node permanent immunity against that threat. However, this does not take place immediately upon infection, but rather after an exponentially distributed random delay with mean . This delay is associated with detection of the malware before obtaining the appropriate patch. Each node obtains the security patch directly from a trusted source, such as a server, or authorized access points, or trained human agents. In Section VI we consider an alternative setting for obtaining these security patches. We use the term recovered for the infective nodes which receive the patch.
Transmission of a packet between a pair of nodes is successful if the received SNR is above the minimum level necessary to decode the signal. The signal power at the receiver node is transmission gain reception gain distance base signal power (1) in which the base signal power is the power of the signal at the output of the transmitter antenna when the transmission gain is unity, and the propagation loss factor is a constant no less than 2, determined by the type of media and geographical features of the network [29] , [30] . Thus, two nodes can communicate only if they are within a certain distance from each other, which we refer to as their communication range. When two nodes are in communication range of each other, we say they are in contact. Here, we investigate the effect of changing the communication range on the propagation dynamics. Nodes are moving in a vast region (of area ) and according to mobility models such as random waypoint or random direction model [31] . Also, the communication range ( ) is small compared to , and speed of the movement is sufficiently high. It is shown (e.g., in [32] ) that under such circumstances, the pairwise inter-contact time is nearly exponentially distributed, and the contact rate of a given pair of nodes is estimated as where , is a constant factor pertaining to the specific mobility model, and is the average relative speed between two nodes. When a susceptible and an infective node are in contact, the infection is transmitted to the former with a certain probability. We assume that does not change with time.
Let be the total number of nodes, and , and , respectively, represent the total number of susceptible, infective, and recovered nodes at time . Following the conditions we assumed for the model, the state of the system evolves according to a pure jump Markov chain. and likewise for and . Recall that ; hence, exists as long as , the node density on the plane, exists. We assume that at time zero, a nonzero portion ( ) of the nodes, but not all of them, are infective:
. Similarly, . Moreover, in general, some fraction of the nodes may be previously immunized to the infection, i.e.,
. Using the fact that , the system of differential equations presented above may be reduced to the following 2-D system (see Fig. 1 )
with the state constraints (3) 1 Henceforth, whenever not ambiguous, the dependency on t is made implicit for brevity.
As we can see from the system dynamics in (2), reduction of the communication range between susceptible and infective nodes, , can repress the propagation of the malware. Recall from (1) that the communication range between an infective transmitter and a susceptible receiver is governed both by the transmission gain of the infective and the reception gain of the susceptible node. This motivates a defense policy for wireless networks: upon detection of malicious behavior, susceptible nodes can reduce their reception gains. Effectively, this results in a reduction of their communication range, which lessens the frequency of contacts between the infective and susceptible nodes. This in turn reduces the rate of propagation of the infection. Thus, the reception gain of the susceptible nodes and hence the communication range can be a control variable, which is bounded between a maximum and minimum value (4) These bounds are imposed by the physical constraints of the device as well as the MAC protocol and the minimum acceptable QoS. Note that the actual bounds of the communication range can always be re-scaled and normalized, and their impact can be captured by an appropriate , so that . Any that satisfies the above constraint is called admissible, and the range is referred to as the admissible range. We make the technical assumption that . On the other hand, in most practical cases, the malware might not have controllable access to the parameters of the MAC, and in such cases, the transmission gain of the infective nodes is unchanged. However, if the malware could indeed modify the transmission gain of the infective nodes, irrespective of the choice of the reception gain of the susceptibles, it is apt to use the maximum transmission range and scanning rate that is physically realizable by the devices, so as to accelerate its spread. The resulting increase in the transmission range of the infectives can be effectively captured through appropriate scaling of , and the model for the dynamics of the system does not change. In particular, note that the malware has no incentive to vary the transmission range over time. 2 We now construct a meaningful cost function which captures the advantages and disadvantages of changing the communication range. Our cost functions are naturally integration of an instantaneous cost over an operation period. Infective nodes can be used by the malware to perform various forms of malicious activities, such as eavesdropping, analyzing the data traversing the network, accessing privileged information, hijacking sessions, disrupting network functionalities such as routing, etc. Hence, the instantaneous cost grows larger with an increase in the fraction of the infective nodes. We naturally assume a linear dependence on . Let us now explore the relation between the instantaneous cost and the communication range. Note that (which is considered to be 1 after appropriate scaling) is the normal communication range of the nodes and constitutes the optimum operating point in absence of malware. Reducing the communication range below undermines the ability of the nodes to deliver their own traffic and increases delays in the end-to-end delivery of messages related to the normal function of the network. This is more so because nodes can not selectively reduce their communication ranges based on whether they are receiving from an infective or a susceptible node. This is because an infected node does not detect that it is infected for some time, and upon detection it is immediately recovered by the system. Thus, information about whether or not a node is infective or susceptible, is not available to that node and to any other nodes. Therefore, the reduction of communication range affects communication of packets between all pairs, and thus deteriorates the overall QoS. 3 We model the effect of changing on the QoS through a double differentiable cost function that increases with decrease in , i.e., for and, without loss of generality,
. To simplify the technical arguments, we further assume is strictly negative. Since the characterization of depends on the implemented MAC and routing policies, we consider two classes of function: 1) concave , i.e., for , and strictly convex , i.e., for . The overall cost incurred by the network therefore can be represented as follows: (5) Coefficient determines the relative importance (hazard) of the infection. The term , where , represents the cost associated with the final tally of the infectives at the end of the operation period. The decision process of the susceptibles may now be represented as a dynamic control problem, that of determination of the that minimizes the network cost over all admissible s subject to satisfaction of the system dynamics in (2)-such a is denoted as the optimal control. Finally, note that we allow to vary as a function of time, i.e., it is selected dynamically, though identically for individual nodes. Particularly, susceptibles may initially choose a lower value of the reception gain to suppress the spread of contagion and to buy time for the recovery process of the nodes to eliminate a safe number of infectives, and subsequently choose higher values of so as to minimally disrupt the network communication. Note that all susceptibles choose the same at each since information about the state of the nodes in a susceptible node's neighborhood is either nonexistent or at best represent a statistics about the average state of the whole network, which is identical for all nodes. In addition, inter-contact times are exponentially distributed, and the memoryless property of the exponential distribution implies that each node is equally likely to meet any node in the future irrespective of its prior contact history.
IV. OPTIMAL
We develop a framework for numerical computation of the optimal control . Note that classical control techniques do not provide the optimal control in closed form since the state dynamics (2) is nonlinear, the overall cost function (5) is not necessarily linear or quadratic in , and the level of infectives is not monotonic, i.e., it can be increasing or decreasing over different intervals of time. We start by proving lemmas 1 and 2. 4 and :
Here, except at the discontinuity epochs of (7) Also, have the following final value constraints: 4 In the terminology of Pontryagin's Maximum Principle, S; I; ; are often referred to as variables, though they are functions of time in reality.
Then, according to Pontryagin's Maximum Principle, any optimal controller , minimizes the Hamiltonian (6) over all admissible controls at each time epoch: (9) where the state and co-state variables are absolutely continuous functions of time that satisfy (2), (7) and (8) with the optimum . Let (10) which is a continuous function of states and co-states and thus, a continuous function of time. This allows us to rewrite the Hamiltonian [in (6)] as follows: (11) Thus, according to (9) , the optimal solution satisfies (12) where is any admissible controller, i.e.,
. Thus, to find the optimal controller, one needs to minimize the function over the admissible set . For strictly concave , is a strictly concave function of , and is therefore minimized at either or .
Let
.
Comparing the values of the function at
, we obtain the optimal as .
For linear , i.e., for , , and the optimal can assume any value in if . Thus, we just have .
On the other hand, for strictly convex , can be minimized at , or at or at at which . This yields the following relation for an optimal :
. (15) We have therefore expressed the optimum as a function of the state and co-state functions. Now, (2) and (7), provide a system of differential equations involving only the state and co-state functions, and not the control function. Using the initial and final values on the state and co-state functions, this system can be solved numerically to obtain the optimum state and co-state functions, which can then be used to compute via (13), (14), (15), and the overall cost via (5).
V. STRUCTURAL RESULTS
In this section, we show that for a concave , any optimal communication range is a bang-bang function of time, that is, it possesses only two possible values and 1 (theorem 1). Moreover, it switches abruptly between the extreme values and has at most two such jumps. An optimal solution for a strictly convex again has at most two switches between and 1, but the transitions are smooth and traverses through all intermediate values (theorem 2). We first observe the following monotonicity result:
Corollary has one of these five forms: it either has no jump and is fixed at or 1 throughout ( or , respectively); or has only one jump of the form or ( or , respectively); or has only two jumps which is necessarily of the form ( ). We first develop some intuition behind the occurrence of each case. If the malware is highly contagious (large ), or highly dangerous (large ), or the recovery process is slow (small ), or the cost inflicted by reducing is low (small ), then susceptibles should maintain throughout. The other extreme arises for small , high , small , or large : deviation from the normal is then sub-optimal. The structure of in cases that lie between these two extremes is not a priori clear. The cost due to the deterioration of QoS depends on the duration and the extent of the reduction of , but not on the timing of such reductions. If is reduced early on and subsequently restored to its normal value of 1, infectives start growing only later and thus the time-accumulative cost due to the growth of the infectives is low, but then since the infection starts spreading later, not enough infectives would be detected and recovered by the end of the operation interval . Hence, the final tally of the infectives may be high as compared to when the reduction of starts (and also ends) later. The timing of the reduction must therefore be chosen depending on the relative values of and and also the spread rate and the recovery rate . The one jump case arises if the reduction is either applied at the beginning or at the end, and the two jump case corresponds to when the reduction is applied in an intermediate interval. Note that the theorem establishes that the reductions must be applied in one contiguous interval and also is never reduced to an intermediate value between and 1-facts that may not be anticipated based on intuition.
Proof: We first consider to be strictly concave, and use the optimal control characterization in (13) . The proof is organized as follows.
Step 1) First we prove that the optimal controller is bangbang (i.e., it assumes only its maximum and minimum values), by arguing that cannot be equal to on an interval of nonzero length.
Step 2) Next we show that can have at most two -crossing points (the time epochs at which changes its sign). From (13) these are the time epochs at which switches between its extreme values, and therefore, the optimal controller has at most two jumps.
Step 3) Finally, we use the terminal value condition of to evince the nature of the jumps of the optimal controller. Proof of Step 1: From the definition of in (10), and state and co-state equations, respectively, in (2) and (7) Thus, in , then in and again after . Now let . As we argued in Step 2, at -crossing points is either always negative, or is decreasing between consecutive -crossing points. This shows that the case of crossing down and then crossing back up is not possible since that would require at its -crossing points to be strictly increasing. Thus, either always stays above in which case throughout, or crosses up once, which is the case in which switches from to . Similar arguments apply for the case of , depending whether or as approaches . This completes Step 3 and thus proves the theorem for strictly concave .
We now consider linear , i.e., , and use the optimal control characterization in (14) . Following similar footsteps that lead to (19) , and using the fact that here
, we obtain
The proof is otherwise similar to that for strictly concave , with replaced with 1. . This therefore constitutes a necessary condition for the optimal control to have two jumps. According to (8) and (17), . Also, from (2b) and following the argument in the proof of lemma 2, we have . The necessary condition therefore is which, for instance, requires .
B. Strictly Convex
Theorem 2: Let Phases 1 and 2 be defined as follows. Qualitatively, the optimal controller for strictly convex shows similar pattern of up to two transitions between a maximum and minimum value as that for concave . The transitions are however smooth for strictly convex as a slight increase in from decreases the cost due to QoS and hence the overall cost significantly. In contrast, for a concave , the decrease in the overall cost as a result of a slight increase in the value of is insignificant and if it is at all beneficial to increase so as to enhance QoS, it is better to increase it to the maximum possible value of 1.
Proof of Theorem 2:
We use the optimal control characterization in (15) . It follows from the continuity of that the optimal is a continuous function of time. Thus, the state and co-state functions and thus any differentiable function of them, e.g., , is differentiable throughout . Note that due to strict convexity and decreasing properties and assumptions on , we have . The following key lemma can be validated similar to the steps 1 and 2 of the proof of theorem 1.
Lemma 3: Consider any . 1) cannot be equal to level over an interval of nonzero length. 2) for at most three time epochs. 3) crosses any level at most at two time epochs in . Moreover, 4) either is negative at these -crossing points or is decreasing between consecutive -crossing points.
Thus, there exists at most one interval of nonzero length on which for any level (e.g., ). Otherwise , as a differentiable function of time, either has to cross more than twice, or has to be at for an interval of positive length, or has to cross down and then above which requires to be non-decreasing between its consecutive -crossing points. However, all of these cases would contradict the above lemma.
Lemma 4: at at most one time epoch during the (only possible) interval on which . Proof: Suppose is zero at in the interval on which , and . Since from lemma 2, is never zero, from the expression for in (16) we must have (21) The relation for in (7) can be rewritten as follows:
Note that over . Thus, is strictly decreasing during this interval. This contradicts (21) .
Next, from (15) otherwise.
The above relation shows that on the interval over which , has the opposite sign of and over such intervals only if .
If throughout , then (15) implies that throughout and we only have phase 2-b. Otherwise, there exists exactly one interval, denoted as , , such that in , and at and . Thus, referring to (15) , over the intervals and , which, respectively, correspond to phases 1-a and 2-b. Second, Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that on the interval over which , i.e., , is either 1) always strictly decreasing; 2) always strictly increasing; or 3) strictly increasing on a sub-interval and strictly decreasing during . Here, we investigate case 1). Similar arguments can be made about cases 2) and 3). In case 1),
. Now either a) throughout ; or b) on , then on . For case a), is strictly increasing over , and assuming , then over (phase 2-a followed by phase 2-b). If , phase 2-b has length zero. On the other hand, for case b), assuming , we have , over
(phase 1-c), then strictly increases over (phase 2-a), then over (phase 1-c). Again, if , phase 2-b has length zero.
VI. DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITY PATCHES THROUGH THE UNDERLYING WIRELESS NETWORK
Security patches may themselves be compromised unless they are obtained directly from trusted resources such as authorized access points, or trained human agents. Nevertheless, we still investigate the alternative (less secure) distribution of the patches through the underlying wireless network. In this case, decreasing the reception gain of the susceptible nodes can increase the delay in delivery of the patches. We therefore replace the recovery rate with where , and show that theorem 1 extends. The differential equation for in (2b) changes to
The Hamiltonian in (6) is updated as follows:
If we update the definition of in (10) as the optimal may be characterized as in (13) and (14) . Rewriting the Hamiltonian using the definition of yields Since the system is autonomous, is a constant. Hence,
At we have (24) The co-state equation for changes to the following:
The time derivative of turns out to be (25) Hence,
[from (24)] [ from (23)] Therefore, and are linear in and theorem 1 can be established using similar arguments as in Section V-B.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND PRACTICAL ISSUES
Dynamic control of the reception gain of the nodes is possible through control of antenna gains, which may be realized through the use of smart antennas and adaptive antenna arrays (see, e.g., [35] , [36] ). A simple example for circuitry and algorithms for achieving controllable gain at the receiver end of adaptive antennas is presented in [37] . Such smart antennas have been implemented, e.g., by Ericsson and Mannesmann Mobilfunk [38] , and are expected to be more pervasive in wireless devices in near future. Note that it may not be possible to adjust antenna gains up to arbitrary precision, and in practice, only a few quantized gain levels may be available. This does not lead to any sub-optimality when the function is concave, since as we proved, the optimal in this case is either at or 1 during different intervals. For a strictly convex , quantization may however lead to sub-optimality as the optimal may assume any intermediate value between and 1. Nevertheless, our numerical computations presented in the next section reveal that the above sub-optimality is insignificant.
In absence of adaptive antennas, reduction of reception gain may be achieved by simply rejecting some of the communication requests. In this case, is the fraction of communication requests accepted by each node. In more details, here the rate of contacts of each pair of node is where is the communication range of the nodes which is now fixed. However, only a fraction of such contacts result in successful communication. Hence, the rate of permitted communication between susceptible and infective nodes is , and hence the governing system of differential equations is the same as before with . Recall that the optimal control for the case of concave is completely specified by (at most two) jump points, and for a strictly convex consists of at most two phases, characterized by at most four time epochs. Thus, the reception gain may be optimally controlled by the nodes without any local or global coordination or information exchange once they know these transition epochs. Upon detection of a new malware in the network, a central surveillance can assess the cost coefficients , the rate of recovery , and estimate (or may already have an estimate of) the spread rate of messages from the mobility pattern and the density of the nodes, etc. Switching epochs can then be calculated and distributed with small communication overhead at time zero. Alternatively, nodes can receive the estimated parameters from the central surveillance and calculate the epochs themselves.
VIII. SIMULATIONS AND NUMERICAL COMPUTATIONS
We first develop some intuition about the trends of changes in the structure of the optimum control as a result of changes in values of parameters . We subsequently demonstrate that overall costs can be substantially lowered by using dynamic optimal reception gain control as compared to static gain control. Moreover, through simulations, we demonstrate how a heuristic policy which utilizes approximate and temporally evolving state information in a node's neighborhood (hence a node-specific policy) compares to our dynamic optimal policy which requires only one time estimates of the system parameters. Finally, we demonstrate that the dynamic optimal policy is robust to errors in the above estimates, and also to quantization errors in gain control.
As Fig. 2 reveals, the optimal control becomes more conservative (selects lower values) for higher values of . However, an interesting phenomenon is that increasing does not necessarily lead to more conservative defense policy. In fact, the defense policy chooses progressively lower values of , when is increased up to a certain value, but once exceeds this threshold the defense barely deviates from the normal value of 1. This is because for large the defense's efficacy is so low that reducing the reception gain does not help the containment but only deteriorates the QoS. The optimal controller becomes more conservative for higher and lower values of respectively (Figs. 3 and 4) . Finally, for large , is reduced earlier so as to reduce the time-accumulative cost associated with the infectives (and increased earlier too to provide the desired QoS) (Fig. 5) . Also, as all the above figures reveal, for concave , usually the optimal is either at 1 throughout or jumps once from to 1, but, scenarios where it has two jumps does indeed arise (Fig. 6) . Fig. 7 compares the overall costs inflicted by the optimal dynamic policy versus the best static policy, as a function of . A static policy is one in which the same value of reception gain is used throughout and we have optimized this fixed value to obtain the best static policy. Our dynamic policy achieves substantially lower costs except when is small; in the latter case its choice is largely static ( most of the time). As we discussed before, a node usually does not have information about the states of those that it contacts. However, by monitoring the anomalous increase in the media access activity as a result of attempts of infective nodes to spread the malware, a node may be able to estimate the number of infectives in its neighborhood. This estimate, however, depends on measurements over fading channels in a network whose topology is constantly changing due to mobility. Hence, these estimates have limited accuracy and are fraught with random errors. An important question that remains to be answered then is whether and how nodes can utilize this noisy information about the number of infective nodes in their neighborhood, even at the cost of higher signal processing and computations. In order to assess the usefulness of these noisy estimates, we develop a heuristic node-specific policy that utilizes the available information, and compare its efficacy against our dynamic optimal control through simulation. In the heuristic policy, each node estimates the number of infective nodes in its neighborhood; however, the state of each neighbor is not flawlessly known. In the simulation, we modeled this imprecision in detection by adding a Gaussian noise with mean zero and power to the indicator that a node is infective or not. Upon contact by one of its neighbors, the receptive node blocks the communication, by reducing its reception gain to , if the estimated fraction of infected nodes in its vicinity is greater than a certain threshold. (We consider very close to 0 and hence when , the communication is effectively blocked). This policy can be optimized over the selected threshold and the size of the sensing area which determines the set of neighbors. Specifically, at any given time , the neighbors of a node are those who are in contact with it in a time window , and depends on the size of the sensing area and node velocity. We choose (as also the decision threshold) so as to minimize the overall cost incurred by the heuristic policy. Our dynamic optimal control blocks communications at all times at which the optimal equals (as again ) and accepts communications otherwise (since the optimal equals 1 otherwise). We ran the simulations for nodes over a period of , with , , (i.e., ), , and considering exponentially distributed inter-contact times, with parameter (refer to Section III, third paragraph), as is the case for random waypoint and random direction mobility models ( [31] , [32] ). The overall cost is calculated for both the heuristic policy and our dynamic policy through simulation as follows: the cost of infectives [ in (5)] is obtained by integrating ( times) the fraction of infectives over time and the cost due to reduction of is considered as the fraction of blocked communications. The latter corresponds to , as when ( , respectively) every contact results in a blocked (successful, respectively) communication and incurs unit (0, respectively) cost as per the function. As Fig. 8 reveals, the heuristic policy attains slightly lower costs than our optimal control policy, which does not use any local or global state information, for small estimation errors. This better performance is due to avoiding unnecessary blocking of communication and hence not losing too much of QoS. However, as the estimation noise increases this advantage quickly diminishes and in fact our dynamic policy significantly outperforms the heuristic. Hence, considering the computation overhead that state estimations introduces and since accuracy in such estimates is hard to achieve, our dynamic policy which requires no state information is preferable.
In order to calculate our dynamic policy, one requires a one time (as opposed to a continuous estimation of the state) estimate of the parameters of the system, e.g., , etc. Here, we demonstrate that the cost achieved by our dynamic policy is robust to errors in estimation of these parameters. Suppose that equals 0.5 but the optimal control is calculated based on an estimate that is somewhere between 0.35 and 0.65. Fig. 9 (a) reveals that the increase in the overall cost as a result of inaccurate estimation of up to 30% is less than 6%. Similar observation holds about : as Fig. 9 (b) depicts, up to 75% error in the estimation of results in less than 2.5% increase in the cost incurred by our dynamic policy. Finally, as we pointed out in the previous section, the reduction of communication rates may only be possible at quantized levels, which leads to sub-optimality only when the function is strictly convex. The quantization of however only minimally increases the overall cost: as Fig. 9(c) and (d) show that even when the number of levels is only 2 (and thus the controller is bang-bang), the increase in cost is less than 3%.
IX. CONCLUSION
We proposed reduction of reception gains of susceptible nodes for containing malware outbreaks in mobile wireless networks. Using optimal control tools, we identified the optimum policy for dynamically controlling the reception gains so as to minimize the overall network costs. We analytically proved that the optimal policies have simple structures when the cost functions are concave and convex, and can therefore be easily implemented in resource constrained devices without requiring constant coordination and information exchange.
Investigation of dynamic control of infective nodes' transmission gains by the malware (instead of selecting the maximum value throughout) constitutes an interesting direction for future research. Such control may be motivated in scenarios where energy limitations lead to premature battery depletions of infective nodes owing to high transmission range selections, which in turn throttles the spread of the infection. Such control may also be necessary in a highly dense network in which a malware might want to avoid jamming during its spreading period, in order not to self-throttle its propagation, and then initiate a more effective jamming attack. These cases, however, will lead to a dynamic game setting as both the network and an attacker will optimize against each other. 
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